The traditional appearance of securities exchanges resembled that of a Janus face. Though performing an integral and indispensable role at the core of market economies, they refused playing by the rules of the system they were supporting. Unlike their capital-seeking customers, they were organized as mutual institutions run by a limited number of trader-owners to protect the franchise. And contrary to investors buying into risky securities, they faced little or no competition and enjoyed the safeness of more or less entrenched local monopolies. But as Janus symbolized the progression from one condition to another in Roman mythology, securities exchanges have undergone a tremendous transformation over the last two decades. Today, most have developed into market-oriented for-profit companies, that are dominated by outside investors. And like firms in other competitive industries, exchanges develop new revenue sources, expand their market share through fierce competition and pursue the consolidation of their industry actively. The process of converting an exchange’s ownership and governance structure and of turning it from a mutual organization into an outsider-dominated institution is referred to as demutualization. This dissertation thesis aims at contributing to a better understanding of this phenomenon.


Stock Exchange Governance Structure Security Exchange Trading Platform Settlement Service 
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