Governance Models for Investment Promotion in Europe


A key issue, which emerged in the context of the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, concerns the institutional aspect of FDI competition between governments, and the need to analyze locational competition not just within the neoclassical framework of the “two-dimensional range of price theory, which examines only price and quantity”,374 but also to consider investment promotion as another area in which governments compete. To follow-up on this point, the underlying institutional governance structure of the competitive process, which involves national or local governments and Investment Promotion Agencies as their agents, will be examined.


Foreign Direct Investment Governance Model Investment Incentive Investment Promotion Greenfield Investment 
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