The Institutional Environment for Policy Competition in Europe


The main actors engaged in locational competition in Europe are the nation states that drive competition for mobile investment among host locations (more or less active depending upon their respective attitudes toward investment promotion) through a mix of FDI policies aimed at creating a favorable investment climate, reducing costs to investors through tax incentives, grants or other mechanisms, and conducting promotional activities in the areas of information dissemination, image building and investor servicing. The same measures have also been mirrored on a subnational level, in particular in the area of incentives, which have become a major policy instrument for regional and local governments.


Foreign Direct Investment Policy Competition Fiscal Incentive Investment Promotion Horizontal Objective 
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