The process of current and future enlargement of the EU adds another dynamic element to the challenges facing the Commission in reforming the existing framework for FDI competition. Here, the balancing act for accession countries and the EU alike is to align the (mostly non-conforming) FDI policies and instruments in the new member countries with the EU competition Aquis, while at the same time allowing the newcomers to maintain a competitive framework for FDI. An effective solution to this issue will depend both on substance as well as the overall approach applied to the process of policy integration. The following sub-chapter will address these issues from an institutional point of view, backed by empirical data.


Gross Domestic Product Regional Integration Accession Country System Harmonization International Country Risk Guide 
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