Reviewing the EU Approach to Regulating FDI Policy Competition


The main conclusion of the positive analysis of FDI policy competition in Europe presented in Chapter 3 is that the EU possesses a sophisticated competition framework that represents a “considerable success in cooperation and policy coordination”.466 It suggested that EU institutions and governance mechanisms in this area are, in principle, well designed to be effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to support the goal of establishing ex ante arrangements for contract governance to save on ex-post transaction costs.467 The following section takes a closer look at the extent to which the overall EU competition framework also represents an effective solution to overcome FDI policy competition issues.


Annex Table Horizontal Objective Agendum Enterprise Award Level Individual Award 


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