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Summary and Policy Recommendations

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Court Delay and Law Enforcement in China
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Abstract

A well functioning legal system shall provide speedy redressal to the parties and easy accessibility of justice to the general public. However, court delay has been an obstacle of the judiciary in developing countries. Legislatures and judicial systems in developing countries still lack the autonomy, stature, resources and competence needed to carry out all of their constitutional functions fully. Courts are overburdened and their proceedings, both criminal and civil, are routinely delayed for years. Judges are, for the most part, poorly trained and low paid, and the courts lack the funding to conduct investigations and administer justice effectively. Furthermore, judicial decisions are heavily influenced by political considerations, intimidation, or outright corruption. Therefore, if the judiciary is to provide the impartiality and efficiency necessary for public trust, a well-defined reform program needs to address the main problems affecting the current quality of and causing constant deterioration to court services. The reform should be a permanent commitment to implement a program to change the inefficient system Moreover, the reform shall not only deal with the symptoms of an inefficient judicial system but also to address the political, economic, and legal roots of an inefficient and inequitable judiciary.

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References

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© 2006 Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag/GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

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(2006). Summary and Policy Recommendations. In: Court Delay and Law Enforcement in China. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-9012-5_7

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