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A Survey of the Functioning of Court System: Duration of the Courts

Abstract

The assessment of the civil justice is based on: litigation cost, time necessary to solve the disputes, and the exactitude of fact-finding and application of law. Court delay, high litigation cost and miscarriage of justice are all symptoms which impedes access to justice.

Keywords

Court System Civil Procedure High Court Lower Court Appellate Court 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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