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Special Problems of the Judicial System in Developing Countries

Abstract

A well functioning judiciary is a central element of civil society.17 The judicial system, as indicated by the World Bank, is considered to be among the top ten significant constraints to private sector development.18 The quality and availability of court services will affect private investment decisions and economic behavior at large, from domestic partnerships to foreign investment. However, basic elements that constitute an efficient judicial system are missing in developing countries.19 These elements are: relatively predictable outcomes within the courts; accessibility of the courts by the population regardless of income level; reasonable time to disposition; and adequate court-provided remedies. In developing countries generally, the judicial systems do not come close to the goals of the judiciary, which should be capable of applying and enforcing laws equitably and efficiently, and laws often are not subject to predictable interpretation. The lack of access to a predictably impartial and efficient judicial system creates uncertainties that hamper completion of new transactions, particularly those involving previously unfamiliar parties and small or start-up businesses. This uncertainty, which is closely related to rapidly increasing backlogs, delays, and corruption, has generated a broad distrust of the system by the private sector and the general public and even increasing concern within the system itself.20

Keywords

Judicial System Civil Code Court System Civil Procedure World Development Report 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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