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Bargaining for Legal Harmonization: Jurisdictional Competition and Legal Obsolescence

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Internationalisierung des Rechts und seine ökonomische Analyse

Abstract

The optimal scope of legal harmonization and the desirable patterns of lawmaking vary according to current legal, social and economic conditions. This essay considers the legal landscape in Europe, characterized both by multijuralism and by the presence of a supranational entity. This dichotomy is important given the global trend toward increased legal harmonization and legal competition, which presents a marked departure for legal systems that for centuries have relied on a complex and unitary body of rules. The essay also considers the optimal choice of legislative instruments given the problems of legal obsolescence and the complexity of the regulation environment.

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Thomas Eger Jochen Bigus Claus Ott Georg von Wangenheim

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© 2008 Gabler | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

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Carbonara, E., Parisi, F. (2008). Bargaining for Legal Harmonization: Jurisdictional Competition and Legal Obsolescence. In: Eger, T., Bigus, J., Ott, C., von Wangenheim, G. (eds) Internationalisierung des Rechts und seine ökonomische Analyse. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-5582-7_25

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