Abstract
Insurance theory does not separate the two main products of the Property and Liability Insurance industry — insurance and risk-sharing. Insurance trades risk at a given premium, while risk-sharing does not require pricing ex ante. This difference helps to explain the emergence of the dual PLI industry structure with mutuals and insurance firms. The paper points out that sharing may be preferred at “new” development risks that are not predictable, and, thus, not possible to price. Insurance, which requires measurable risks, has a comparative advantage at “old” experienced risks, such as fire or traffic. Mutually beneficial sharing requires that the pool members are faced with equal risks. If the risks differ they may be unified or modified to simplify sharing. Public support to victims of unforeseen catastrophes can, under certain conditions, be motivated by efficiency rather then by fairness.
I am grateful for comments by Hong Wu and Helen Forslind. Financial support from Statens Energimyndighet, STEM, is hereby acknowledged.
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Skogh, G. (2008). Risk-Sharing and Insurance: Contracts with Different Institutional Implications. In: Eger, T., Bigus, J., Ott, C., von Wangenheim, G. (eds) Internationalisierung des Rechts und seine ökonomische Analyse. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-5582-7_21
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