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Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it will position the dissertation within the field of entrepreneurship research. Entrepreneurship research has gained in importance over the recent years, and there are numerous areas of entrepreneurship science that have emerged and developed from pure exploration to a more grounded theory.

Keywords

Technology Transfer Venture Capital Entrepreneurial Orientation Entrepreneurship Research Academic Entrepreneurship 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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