Abstract
Classical and neoclassical economics regard all men as egoists who are only interested in their own well-being. Nev ertheless, these egoists are trustworthy, stand to contracts and obey the law. Nowadays, modern economics models people as opportunists who are sel fish without any constraints. Opportunists would lie or even commit crimes, as long as they gain personally from doing so, even if only marginally. Agency theory analyses and designs constraints, in order to induce opportunists to behave as well as possible. However, these outer restrictions on egoistic preferences with no inner limitations seem too narrow. As well as economists are not interested in the content of egoistical preferences, they should not limit the autonomy of individuals to egoistic ends.
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Dilger, A. (2008). Economics with Ethical Preferences. In: Scherer, A.G., Patzer, M. (eds) Betriebswirtschaftslehre und Unternehmensethik. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-5565-0_3
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