Abstract
In this section the results of the empirical analysis are presented. The introductory analysis deals with possible differences between industry sectors and shows the average early warning behavior of German CEOs in the manufacturing industry who participated in this survey. Part two and three of the introductory analysis present the early warning behavior as dependent on success of early warning and on organizational size. The following paragraph deals with the empirical valuation of the research hypotheses deduced in section D. First, the three different types of hypotheses are explained and the adequate methods of analysis are presented. Then, the hypotheses deduced within the context of the classical contingency approach and of its extension are valuated. Relating to the latter mentioned hypotheses, an additional analysis shows to which degree each attitude explains the design variables of early warning. The last paragraph of this section is the concluding analysis. Here, the classical contingency theory is combined with its extension and the explanatory power of both is compared. Then, the relationship between success of early warning and the economic success of the organization is analyzed. Finally, a cluster analysis is conducted in order to obtain groups of CEOs characterized by specific attitudes and early warning behavior.
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References
See Bortz and Döring (2003), p. 530f.
See Daft, Sormunen and Parks (1988), p. 131.
See Smeltzer, Fann and Nikolaisen (1988), p. 57.
In this context a successful organization is an organization with a high degree of success of early warning. For further explanation see Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom (1996), p. 194.
See Steiners (2005), p. 173 for a description of this procedure.
For a detailed description of the Levene test see Levene (1960) and Eckstein (1999), p. 161ff.
This is partially supported by the findings of Daft, Sormunen and Parks (1988), p. 133. They find that successful organizations use all personal sources more than unsuccessful organizations do.
See Galbraith (1973), p. 30ff.
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Nevertheless, the optimal fit between scanning frequency and perceived strategic uncertainty is measured. See Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom (1996), p. 196.
See Dollinger (1984), p. 359.
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This is assumed by Kunze who postulates circles of early warning with a fixed point in time for interpretation. See Kunze (2000), p. 284ff.
See Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom (1996), p. 195.
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Aguilar as well as Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom come to opposite findings. Again, this can be explained by the difference of the sample. The range of organizations of these two studies was much broader. See Aguilar (1967), p. 52f. and Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom (1996), p. 199.
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In this context Quinn shows that a product-diversified company tends to decentralize monitoring activities whereas a non-diversified one is likely to centralize them. See Quinn (1985), p. 73f. See also Chenhall (2003), p. 148 and Child and Mansfield (1972), p. 371f.
Smeltzer, Fann and Nikolaisen (1988), p. 19. See also Churchill and Lewis (1983), p. 31.
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See Götz and Liehr-Gobbers (2004), p. 721 and Bliemel, Eggert, Fassott and Henseler (2005), p. 10. In this context the coefficient of determination R2 is of no interest as one single exogenous variable is not supposed to determine mainly one endogenous variable. The extent to which an exogenous variable explains an endogenous one is studied later on. In these analyses all contingency variables are considered together.
See Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom (1996), p. 195ff.
This corresponds to the multiple regression analysis applied by Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom (1996).
In this context Daft, Sormunen and Parks (1988) and Elenkov (1997) use the same method. See Daft, Sormunen and Parks (1988), p. 132 and Elenkov (1997), p. 298.
See Daft, Sormunen and Parks (1988), p. 132.
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In analogy with G 1.2.2 success in this context is success of early warning. See also Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom (1996), p. 196.
See also Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom (1996), p. 196, for a similar procedure.
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(2007). Results of the Empirical Analysis. In: A Contingency-Based View of Chief Executive Officers’ Early Warning Behavior. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-5504-9_7
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