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Abstract

In this section the results of the empirical analysis are presented. The introductory analysis deals with possible differences between industry sectors and shows the average early warning behavior of German CEOs in the manufacturing industry who participated in this survey. Part two and three of the introductory analysis present the early warning behavior as dependent on success of early warning and on organizational size. The following paragraph deals with the empirical valuation of the research hypotheses deduced in section D. First, the three different types of hypotheses are explained and the adequate methods of analysis are presented. Then, the hypotheses deduced within the context of the classical contingency approach and of its extension are valuated. Relating to the latter mentioned hypotheses, an additional analysis shows to which degree each attitude explains the design variables of early warning. The last paragraph of this section is the concluding analysis. Here, the classical contingency theory is combined with its extension and the explanatory power of both is compared. Then, the relationship between success of early warning and the economic success of the organization is analyzed. Finally, a cluster analysis is conducted in order to obtain groups of CEOs characterized by specific attitudes and early warning behavior.

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(2007). Results of the Empirical Analysis. In: A Contingency-Based View of Chief Executive Officers’ Early Warning Behavior. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-5504-9_7

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