Contingency Theory as an Approach to Explain Early Warning Behavior


Now the underlying theory of this work will be introduced. According to the research questions not only the early warning behavior of CEOs of medium-sized companies has to be assessed in general but also factors that influence this behavior have to be analyzed. Therefore, in the following the contingency theory which aims to explain organizational structure and design by considering contextual variables will be presented. First, the classical approach will be explained, followed by its extension. Then, the criticism of the contingency theory is presented and discussed. After that, it will be discussed whether this theory is appropriate to answer the research questions. In part four, the research model and its variables will be deduced by combining the classical approach of the contingency theory and its extension with the model of DAFT and WEICK. Finally, in part five the state of empirical research will be presented.


Design Variable Organizational Structure Early Warning Internal Model Organizational Design 


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