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Concept and Methodology for Optimizing Distribution Systems

Abstract

Asset management firms face a complex relationship problem when they market their mutual funds to private investors through distributing intermediaries, most notably via banks. As outlined above, a move away from rather high control arrangements to enjoy the advantages of decentralization has been accompanied by substantial impediments and disappointments. Management science at large and research efforts particularly in the area of marketing frequently address these practical relationship challenges from a normative perspective to clarify the way in which organizational choice and design secure efficiency and ultimately economic success. In this regard, the challenges facing asset management firms at large can be rephrased as an optimization problem of how to minimize inefficient issues of coordination and motivation in order to achieve desired distribution performance levels.

Keywords

Mutual Fund Institutional Arrangement Private Investor Asset Management Market Dynamic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Gabler | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2008

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