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The Central Propositions of Resource-based Theory

Abstract

According to Sutton and Staw (1995), building a theory is a complex process and there is still a lack of agreement amongst scholars on what theory is and should be.22 Varied interpretations can be found whether a model or a framework equates a theory or whether being falsifiable is seen as a sine qua non for the very existence of a theory.23 As Merton (1967) asserts:

...the word theory threatens to become meaningless. Because its referents are so diverse — including everything from minor working hypotheses, through comprehensive but vague and unordered speculations, to axiomatic systems of thought — use of the word often obscures rather than creates understanding. (Merton (1967), p. 39)

Following Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986), several theories can be found within strategic management, all basically trying to explain firm performance, to clarify performance differences between firms and to give prescriptive implications on how to gain competitive advantages and, hence, sustainable performance.24 Recently, in trying to accomplish these objectives, there has been a shift of perspective: before, researchers were focusing on firmexternal factors, whereas now firm-internal factors (i.e., resources) come to the fore. The emergence of this resource-based perspective has also triggered a new discussion within strategic management on the subject of what theory is and what it is not. Participants are basically arguing whether this resource-based perspective currently known as the resourcebased view (RBV) can actually be regarded as resource-based theory (RBT).

Keywords

Competitive Advantage Information Asymmetry Strategic Management Dynamic Capability Factor Market 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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