Epistemological concept: entrepreneurs as human agents
There have been noticeable cases of both new venture failure, e.g. in the e-commerce sector, as well as aborted investments in new ventures in the venture capital market (cf., for example, Hager et al., 2004 and Ravenpor, 2004). This raises the question of how resource acquisition and allocation action by both entrepreneurs and external financiers of new ventures may be conceptualized. This kind of explanation is of necessity different from perfect resource allocation by actors equipped with complete and infallible knowledge in a rational choice world where the above failure anomalies would be difficult to explain.
KeywordsBehavioural Intention Human Agent Entrepreneurial Intention Stimulus Perception Venture Capital Market
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 18.This active internal construction of stimuli content may also function as a bridge between perceptive sensory gaps which naturally occur because human perception is not a continuous process; rather perception depends on the brain’s own operating frequency (cf. in particular Poeppel, 1985, 41p.).Google Scholar
- 19.This internal activity was also observed by Chapman et al. (2000), who compare a classic behavioural stimulus-response model of pain perception with a more suitable constructivist concept. The latter appreciates individual differences in the experience of pain based on differences in past personal experiences of pain stored in memory.Google Scholar
- 20.In addition, neuronal plasticity with the aid of electro-chemical neurotransmitters which modulate synaptic connections between neurons by impeding or enhancing impulses also seems to play a role in human creativity (Roth, 2001). Neuronal plasticity allows the association and combination of perceived stimuli and internal pieces of knowledge in different ways said to be the basis of divergent creative thinking.Google Scholar
- 21.This is in fact a general theme in constructivist reasoning, based on v. Glasersfeld’s famous lock-and-key metaphor (ibid.).Google Scholar
- 22.Also cf. the notion of subjective models of environment in Kerber (1997, 51) and the lack of universal, subject-independent planning information as pointed out by Koch (1996).Google Scholar
- 23.From the cognitive-neurological perspective, these deeper structures may be viewed as relations largely relating to personal episodic memory and non-declarative memory (cf. Anderson, 1996, 144).Google Scholar
- 24.Note that effectuation research has also shown that entrepreneurial thinking often also works the other way around by starting with given means at hand and then imagining what ends could be ‘effectuated’ and attained by them (cf., for example, Sarasvathy & Kotha, 2001).Google Scholar
- 25.Language may reduce complexity in interaction as it “guides our sense of social reality, by framing, filtering, and creation to transform the subjective into a more tangible reality” (Nicholson & Anderson, 2005, 155).Google Scholar
- 27.Similarly, the sense-making of newly emerging technologies, as well as attributions of utility or risk that go with these new developments, are also constructed in communication processes (cf. Dollhausen 1997, 99; Rosa, 1998; and Hargadon & Douglas, 2001).Google Scholar