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Abstract

Many studies illustrate that restructuring efforts such as business exit have a strategic dimension. This point of view is based on several assumptions: “The first assumption is that strategic restructuring is typically a response to changing environmental and/or organizational conditions. The second assumption is that environmental and organizational pressures are largely, but not totally, identifiable and unambiguous in initiating such restructuring. The third and fourth assumptions are that many organizations currently face these clear pressures for a strategic adaptive response, and that many of these organizations seek to respond by restructuring. A fifth and final assumption is that restructuring generally enhances organizational performance. Taken together, these assumptions form the basis for a strategic perspective on restructuring: namely, that there are pressures that provide a stimulus for corporate restructuring, that these forces affect many organizations, many of whom respond by restructuring, which enhances performance.” Specifically, what is then the strategic dimension of the asset restructuring transaction “business exit”?

Keywords

Institutional Theory Strategic Action Institutional Pressure Diversify Firm Dominant Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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