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Abstract

In this chapter the literature on business exit is reviewed. Starting with Porter (1976), I used the Business Source Premier Database for the identification of relevant articles and focused my search on the keywords ‘restructuring’, ‘exit’, ‘divestiture’, and ‘divestment’. In order to enrich my literature base mainly derived from management research, I included some studies from different but related fields such as finance and economics.

Keywords

Firm Performance Business Unit Corporate Manager Parent Firm Valuation Effect 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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