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Abstract

Social psychology literature defines social influence24 as the force one person (the agent) exerts on someone else (the target) to induce a change in the behaviors, attitudes, goals, and values of the target.25 Accordingly, influence occurs at the individual level of analysis between at least two individual actors in a social relationship.26 In an organizational context, influence can be interpreted as a facet of leadership behavior that aims to coordinate subordinates’ actions in order to attain common organizational objectives.27

Keywords

Social Influence Power Base Power Theory Influence Strategy Power Part 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    This influence strategy was labeled upward appeal by Kipnis/ Schmidt/ Wilkinson (1980), pp. 447f.Google Scholar
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