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Theoretical background for buy-and-build strategies

Abstract

This chapter summarises the relevant theoretical background for buy-and-build strategies. After a definition and delineation of buy-and-build strategies, it outlines relevant existing research concerning value creation and also success factors for value creation in buyouts and M&A.

Keywords

Cash Flow Abnormal Return Capital Structure Success Factor Private Equity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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