Theoretical background for buy-and-build strategies
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Abstract
This chapter summarises the relevant theoretical background for buy-and-build strategies. After a definition and delineation of buy-and-build strategies, it outlines relevant existing research concerning value creation and also success factors for value creation in buyouts and M&A.
Keywords
Cash Flow Abnormal Return Capital Structure Success Factor Private Equity
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References
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- 402.The opportunity to increase the debt capacity does not depend on the existence of unused leverage on the part of the companies involved prior to consolidation. Even if the debt capacity were fully exploited, the increase of the financial leverage would be possible in the case of the M&A due to the altered risk profile, Lewellen, W.G. (1971), p. 534.Google Scholar
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- 405.Unsystematic risk is specific to each company and can be diversified away. Diversification, however, is not possible for systematic risk because it is common to the overall market, Sharpe. W.F. (1970), p. 96.Google Scholar
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- 419.Seth, A. (1990a), p. 108. For example, studies which apply different categorisations to differentiate M&A transactions by their degree of relatedness lead ceteris paribus to different results. In addition, sampling criteria (e.g., the size of transactions considered) might also cause a bias in the research findings. SETH finds that the size of the target relative to the acquirer has an impact on synergies and, hence, value creation, Seth, A. (1990a), pp. 112–113.Google Scholar
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- 575.Possible reasons are, for example, continuous cooperation in the case of spin-off buyouts, support of a successful completion of the transaction, and participation in a positive business development in the future, Berger, M. (1993), p. 192; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 100.Google Scholar
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- 577.KERLER describes the different roles of external parties involved in an M&A transaction, Kerler, P. (2000), pp. 242–258.Google Scholar
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