Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Introduction to buyouts

  • Chapter
German Buyouts Adopting a Buy and Build Strategy

Abstract

This chapter provides a summary of key information about the buyout phenomenon. It contains a definition and a delineation of different types of buyouts, an overview of key participants in the buyout market, and also an outline of the historic development in relevant buyout markets.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Forst, M. (1992), pp. 5–6; Forst, M. (1993), p. 5; Hoffmann, P./Ramke, R. (1992), p. 22; Honert, J. (1995), pp. 7–8; Huydts, H.J. (1992), p. 19; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 9; Neukirchen, D. (1996), pp. 4 and 6; Schmid, H. (1994), p. 5.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Schmid, H. (1994), p. 9.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Arbeitskreis Finanzierung der Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft (1990), pp. 831–832.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Forst, M. (1993), p. 6; Neukirchen, D. (1996), pp. 5 and 13–17; Schmid, H. (1994), p. 21. In Germany, the NewCo typically has the legal form of a ‘Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH)’, Schmid, H. (1994), p. 128.

    Google Scholar 

  5. The cost of capital reflects the expected minimum rate of return (discount rate) to capital providers in the market, which is necessary to attract funds to a particular investment, Breuer, W. (1994), p. 819.

    Google Scholar 

  6. The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the average cost of capital of all firm’s securities. The weights are determined by the relative proportions of the different securities in a firm’s capital structure, Breuer, W. (1998), p. 56.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Breuer, W. (1998), p. 44; Schmid, H. (1994), p. 187.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Gerke, W./ Steiner, M. (2001), pp. 1323–1324.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Gutenberg, E. (1987), pp. 208 et seqq. See also Bühner, R. (1990a), pp. 149–152.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Breuer, W. (1998), pp. 58–59; Kim, E.H. (1978), p. 45.

    Google Scholar 

  11. For an overview of explicit and implicit assumptions, see e.g., Copeland, T.E./ Weston, J.F. (1992), p. 439.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Modigliani, F./ Miller, M.H. (1958), pp. 261–297. Several authors have confirmed the MM no-tax theorem, see e.g., Baron, D.P. (1974); Hamada, R.S. (1969); Stiglitz, J.E. (1969, 1974); Rubinstein, M.E. (1973). However, the assumption of constant (i.e., risk independent) cost of capital for debt by MM has been questioned by critics. STIGLITZ and RUBINSTEIN prove that even taking into account that the cost of debt rises with increasing leverage, the assumption of constant WACC by MM still holds true, Rubinstein, M.E. (1973); Stiglitz, J.E. (1969).

    Google Scholar 

  13. Modigliani, F./ Miller, M.H. (1963), pp. 433–443.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Baxter, N.D. (1967), p. 395. DeANGELO/MASULIS analyse the impact of corporate and personal taxation on the capital structure. They conclude that ‘each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision due solely to the interaction of personal and corporate tax treatment of debt and equity’, see DeAngelo, H./Masulis, R.W. (1980), p. 27.

    Google Scholar 

  15. For various direct and indirect costs, see e.g., Franke, G./ Hax, H. (2003), p. 11.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Hirshleifer, J. (1970), p. 264; Kraus, A./Litzenberger, R.H. (1973), pp. 911–922; Robichek, A.A./Myers, S.C. (1965), pp. 20–22.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Breuer, W. (1998), pp. 109–112; Fama, E.F./French, K.R. (2004); Frank, M.Z./Goyal, V.K. (2003); Haugen, R.A./Senbet, L.W. (1978); Long, M.S./Malitz, E.B. (1985); Titman, S./Wessels, R. (1988).

    Google Scholar 

  18. For more detailed information on the efficiency of capital markets, see Fama, E.F. (1970).

    Google Scholar 

  19. Breuer, W. (1998), pp. 119–120

    Google Scholar 

  20. For a detailed overview, see e.g., Breuer, W. (1998), pp. 212–234; Hart, O. (2001).

    Google Scholar 

  21. Pecking-order theory states that companies have a preferred hierarchy for financing sources. They prefer internal financing (retained earnings and the effects of depreciation) before they draw on any form of external funds. If a company must use external funds, the order of preference is the following: debt, convertible securities, preferred stock, and common stock, Myers, S.C. (1984).

    Google Scholar 

  22. Arbeitskreis Finanzierung der Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft (1990), p. 832; Baker, G.P./Montgomery, CA. (1994), p. 1; Birley, S. (1984), p. 33; Honert, J. (1995), p. 32; Huydts, H.J. (1992), p. 22; Then Bergh, F. (1998), p. 8.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Forst, M. (1993), pp. 6–7; Hatzig, C. (1995), p. 23; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 9; Schmid, H. (1994), p. 41; Then Bergh, F. (1998), p. 9.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Comptroller of the Currency.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Schmid, H. (1994), p. 42. The term ‘debt’ includes senior and also subordinated/junior debt.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Berger, M. (1993), pp. 6 and 19; Grundfest, J.A. (1989), p. 255; Honert, J. (1995), p. 34; McNeill Stancill, J. (1988), p. 18; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 11.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Küting, K/ Weber, C.-P. (1999), pp. 136–137.

    Google Scholar 

  28. E.g., Schmidt, R. (1993), p. 282. Most authors share a common understanding of the general definition of the term ‘cash flow’. The detailed definitions, however, are diverse, Rehkugler, H./Poddig, T. (1988), p. 220. For a critical assessment of different cash flow definitions, see Coenenberg, A.G. (2000), pp. 933–943.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), pp. 83–84.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), pp. 84–85; Honert, J. (1995), pp. 34–36; Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 66 and 206; Schwien, B. (1995), p. 87.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), pp. 82–83; Honert, J. (1995), p. 34; Schmid, H. (1994), p. 130. Historically in the US and also in the UK, the share of debt has been significantly higher compared to more recent buyout transactions, see e.g., Burge, S.W. (1994), p. 32; Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 138 and 140.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), p. 79; Honert, J. (1995), pp. 32–34; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 205.

    Google Scholar 

  33. Schmid, H. (1994), p. 133.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 133–134.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), p. 23; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 67.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Forst, M. (1992), pp. 13–14; Hoffmann, P./Ramke, R. (1992), pp. 86–88; Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 67–68.

    Google Scholar 

  37. Forst, M. (1993), p. 145; Honert, J. (1995), p. 40.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), p. 82; Honert, J. (1995), p. 37; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 87; Schmid, H. (1994), p. 130. FORST, GRÄPER and LUIPPOLD report a mezzanine share of approximately 25%, Forst, M. (1992), p. 99; Gräper, M. (1993), p. 110; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 215. Based on a sample of eight buyouts, VEST even states a mezzanine share of approximately 45%, Vest, P. (1995), pp. 258–259.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 67; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 86. In Germany, this type of financing is typically structured as ‘partiarische Darlehen’,’ stille Beteiligungen’, and ‘Genußscheine’, see e.g., Schmid, H. (1994), p. 135–136.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 136–137.

    Google Scholar 

  41. Forst, M. (1992), p. 9; Hoffmann, P./Ramke, R. (1992), p. 81; Wright, M./Robbie, K. (1996), p. 692.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), p. 94; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 69; Schmid, H. (1994), p. 130; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 78.

    Google Scholar 

  43. Forst, M. (1992), p. 25; Hoffmann, P./Ramke, R. (1992), p. 82; Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 69 and 130; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 87.

    Google Scholar 

  44. This categorisation does not include buyouts which involve different types of buyers (so-called ‘hybrid forms’). For an overview, see Jakoby, S. (2000), p. 26.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Beaver, G. (2001), pp. 307–308; Huydts, H.J. (1992), p. 20.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Jakoby, S. (2000), pp. 15–16.

    Google Scholar 

  47. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Chiplin, B./ Albrighton, M. (2000), p. 140.

    Google Scholar 

  48. Wright, M./ Thompson, S./ Robbie, K. (1992), p. 50.

    Google Scholar 

  49. Arbeitskreis Finanzierung der Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft (1990), pp. 831–832; Baruch, Y./Gebbie, D. (1998), p. 423; Beaver, G. (2001), p. 309; Boxberg, F. von (1991), pp. 9–10; Drukarczyk, J. (1990), p. 545; Forst, M. (1992), p. 8; Krebs, A.E. (1990), p. 6; Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 18 and 22–23; Wright, M./Hoskisson, R.E./Busenitz, L.W. (2001), p. 148.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 32–33.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Neukirchen, D. (1996), p. 4; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 5.

    Google Scholar 

  52. Forst, M. (1992), p. 7; Milde, H. (1990b), p. 655; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 5.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Honert, J. (1995), p. 8; Neukirchen, D. (1996), p. 4.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Berger, M. (1993), p. 7; Huydts, H. J. (1992), p. 21.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Arbeitskreis Finanzierung der Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft (1990), p. 832; Schmid, H. (1994), p. 33.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Jakoby, S. (2000), p. 17. For a critical assessment of this delineation criterion, see Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 33–34, footnote 93.

    Google Scholar 

  57. For a more detailed overview of secondary MBO characteristics, see e.g., Jakoby, S. (2000), pp. 12–13; Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 35–37; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 5.

    Google Scholar 

  58. Birley, S. (1984), p. 33; Forst, M. (1993), pp. 16–17; Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 44–45.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Albach, H. (1989), p. 105.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Chiplin, B./ Albrighton, M. (2000), p. 140.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), p. 24.

    Google Scholar 

  62. Luippold, T. L. (1991), p. 16; Wright, M./Robbie, K. (1996), p. 691.

    Google Scholar 

  63. Achleitner, A.-K./ Fingerle, C.H. (2003), p. 8; Wright, M./Robbie, K. (1996), p. 692. LAUB, however, holds a different view and considers the defined combination of incumbent managers and new managers in East German companies as industrial buy-ins, Laub, J. (1995), p. 24.

    Google Scholar 

  64. Honert, J. (1995), p. 12.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Achleitner, A.-K./ Fingerle, C.H. (2003), p. 8; Beaver, G. (2001), p. 309; Forst, M. (1993), p. 10; Hoffmann, P./Ramke, R. (1992), p. 24; Nadig, L. (1992), p. 23.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Berger, M. (1993), p. 14.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Schwien, B. (1995), p. 20.

    Google Scholar 

  68. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Chiplin, B./ Albrighton, M. (2000), p. 140; Wright, M./Robbie, K. (1996), pp. 691–692.

    Google Scholar 

  69. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), p. 29.

    Google Scholar 

  70. Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 14.

    Google Scholar 

  71. Berger, M. (1993), pp. 22–23; Jakoby, S. (2000), p. 36; Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 159–161.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Jakoby, S. (2000), p. 39.

    Google Scholar 

  73. Berger, M. (1993), p. 23; Forst, M. (1992), p. 80; Huydts, H.J. (1992), p. 28; Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 22 and 160; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 14. SCHMID, however, argues that the ‘maintenance of company tradition’ might be an overstated argument. For more details, see Schmid, H. (1994), p. 87.

    Google Scholar 

  74. Forst, M. (1992), p. 41; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 161.

    Google Scholar 

  75. Gräper, M. (1993), p. 105.

    Google Scholar 

  76. Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 18. The sale of a devision or subsidiary can also be defined as spin-off buyout, Forst, M. (1993), p. 12; Nadig, L. (1992), p.11. However according to BERGER, this understanding of spin-off assumes a definition of spin-off in a broader sense, Berger, M. (1993), pp. 10–11.

    Google Scholar 

  77. Berger, M. (1993), p. 25; Forst, M. (1992), pp. 63–64; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 19; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 15.

    Google Scholar 

  78. Berger, M. (1993), p. 25; Forst, M. (1992), p. 65; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 19.

    Google Scholar 

  79. Berger, M. (1993), p. 25; Forst, M. (1992), pp. 64–66.

    Google Scholar 

  80. The term ‘conglomerate discount’ circumscribes the fact that the total value of a conglomerate may be lower than the sum of its parts if valued independently, see e.g., Maksimovic, V./ Phillips, G. (2002).

    Google Scholar 

  81. Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 19.

    Google Scholar 

  82. Berger, M. (1993), p. 26; Honert, J. (1995), p. 12.

    Google Scholar 

  83. Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 19.

    Google Scholar 

  84. Berger, M. (1993), p. 25; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 19; Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 15.

    Google Scholar 

  85. Berger, M. (1993), p. 26; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 19.

    Google Scholar 

  86. Forst, M. (1992), p. 80; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 20.

    Google Scholar 

  87. Müller, R. (1986), pp. 33–34.

    Google Scholar 

  88. Baetge, J./ Plock, M. (2001), p. 798.

    Google Scholar 

  89. Bellinger, B. (1962), p. 53.

    Google Scholar 

  90. E.g., Krystek, U. (1987), p. 67; Müller, R. (1986), pp. 64–65

    Google Scholar 

  91. For an overview of how early warning systems can be used to indicate a company crisis, see e.g., Schmidt, R. (1994).

    Google Scholar 

  92. Kraft, V. (2001), p. 71.

    Google Scholar 

  93. For more details on the turnaround process, see Kraft, V. (2001), pp. 65–70.

    Google Scholar 

  94. For details on the delineation of turnaround and restructuring, see Kraft, V. (2001), pp. 64–65 and Nadig, L. (1992), pp. 55–60.

    Google Scholar 

  95. Jakoby, S. (2000), p. 43.

    Google Scholar 

  96. Jakoby, S. (2000), p. 44.

    Google Scholar 

  97. Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 22–23.

    Google Scholar 

  98. Schwenkedel, S. (1991), p. 16.

    Google Scholar 

  99. Vickers, J./ Yarrow, G. (1991), pp. 113–121.

    Google Scholar 

  100. Laub, J. (1995), pp. 38–39 and 47; Schwien, B. (1995), pp. 30–33.

    Google Scholar 

  101. Treuhand (1994), p. 1. For reasons why buyouts might not be feasible to privatise formerly state-owned companies in the eastern part of Germany, see Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 163–165.

    Google Scholar 

  102. Stahl, M. (1995), pp. 197–198.

    Google Scholar 

  103. Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 162.

    Google Scholar 

  104. Jones, T.M./ Hunt, R.O. (1991), p. 833; Kessel, A. (1994), p. 85; Nadig, L. (1992), p. 23.

    Google Scholar 

  105. DeAngelo, H./ DeAngelo, L.E. (1987), pp. 44–45. FORST, however, doubts that cost savings are a relevant reason for a going-private buyout, given that other cost blocks such as executive compensation are more significant compared to listing costs, Forst, M. (1993), p. 32.

    Google Scholar 

  106. Berger, M. (1993), p. 26.

    Google Scholar 

  107. Kessel, A. (1994), p. 87.

    Google Scholar 

  108. Milde, H. (1990a), p. 8.

    Google Scholar 

  109. BVK (2005), p. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  110. For more detailed information, see EVCA (2003) and NVCA (2003).

    Google Scholar 

  111. Kraft, V. (2001), pp. 34–35.

    Google Scholar 

  112. Bader, H. (1996), p. 113.

    Google Scholar 

  113. Kraft, V. (201), p. 38.

    Google Scholar 

  114. Bader, H. (1996), pp. 172–173 and 275.

    Google Scholar 

  115. Kraft, V. (201), p. 38.

    Google Scholar 

  116. Kraft, V. (2001), p. 38.

    Google Scholar 

  117. Bader, H. (1996), p. 17. GOTTSCHALG distinguishes four complementary roles of private equity firms: valuation expert, facilitator of organisational change, financier of the best management team, and ‘governance intermediary’, Gottschalg, O. (2000), pp. 13–24.

    Google Scholar 

  118. Bader, H. (1996), p. 154.

    Google Scholar 

  119. Kraft, V. (2001), p. 39.

    Google Scholar 

  120. Bader, H. (1996), pp. 156–157; Toll, D.M. et al. (1999), p.13.

    Google Scholar 

  121. Bader, H. (1996), p. 157.

    Google Scholar 

  122. Fenn, G.W./ Liang, N./ Prowse, S. (1997), p. 47.

    Google Scholar 

  123. Bader, H. (1996), p. 158.

    Google Scholar 

  124. Bader, H. (1996), p. 156.

    Google Scholar 

  125. Bader, H. (1996), p. 158.

    Google Scholar 

  126. Bader, H. (1996), p. 157; Toll, D.M. (1999), pp. 14–15.

    Google Scholar 

  127. Schmid, H. (1994), p. 111.

    Google Scholar 

  128. Ambrose, B.W./ Winters, D.B. (1992), p. 94; Braun, C. (1989), p. 21; Fox, I./Marcus, A. (1992), p. 67; Hoffmann, P./Ramke, R. (1992), pp. 51–52 and 58–59; Honert, J. (1995), pp. 54–59; Jakoby, S. (2000), p. 234; Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 55–60. However, in some cases buyouts are targeted to realise growth opportunities and also take place in high-tech sectors, e.g. Robbie, K./Wright, M./Albrighton, M. (1999); Wright, M./Burrows, A./Loihl, A. (2001), pp. 12–15; Wright, M./Hoskisson, R.E./Busenitz, L.W. (2001). For an overview of key criteria for buyouts, see e.g., Jakoby, S. (2000), pp. 225–229; Reicheneder, T. (1992), p. 193.

    Google Scholar 

  129. Braun, C. (1989), p. 22; Hoffmann, P./Ramke, R. (1992), p. 62.

    Google Scholar 

  130. For a more detailed overview of financing stages, see e.g., Fenn, G.W./ Liang, N./ Prowse, S. (1997), p. 28; Kraft, V. (2001), p. 45; Ruhnka, J.C./Young, J.E. (1987); Sahlman, W.A. (1990), p. 479.

    Google Scholar 

  131. Gompers, P./ Lemer, J. (2001), p. 146

    Google Scholar 

  132. ‘Bootstrap’ financing in the 1960s was one form of company acquisition similar to the buyout concept, see e.g., Schmid, H. (1994), pp. 49–50. The second similar form was the phenomenon of going private transactions of small listed companies through a share buyback by the company owners in the 1970s, see Schmid, H. (1994), p. 51.

    Google Scholar 

  133. Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 7; Hoffmann, P./Ramke, R. (1992), p. 31, Schmid, H. (1994), p. 48.

    Google Scholar 

  134. Fenn, G.W./ Liang, N./ Prowse, S. (1997), p. 23.

    Google Scholar 

  135. Baker, G. P./ Montgomery, C.A. (1994), p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  136. Berger. M. (1993), p. 38; Hoffmann, P./Ramke, R. (1992), p. 23.

    Google Scholar 

  137. Allen, J.R. (1999), p. 708.

    Google Scholar 

  138. Kitching, J. (1989), p. 74.

    Google Scholar 

  139. Berger, M. (1993), p. 39.

    Google Scholar 

  140. Bühner, R. (1990a), p. 143. For more detailed deal information, see Michel, A./Shaked, I. (1991).

    Google Scholar 

  141. Jensen, M.C. (1991), pp. 27–29.

    Google Scholar 

  142. Kaplan, S.N./ Stein, J.C. (1993), p. 313.

    Google Scholar 

  143. Allen, J.R. (1999), p. 712.

    Google Scholar 

  144. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004).

    Google Scholar 

  145. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Thompson, S. (1991), p. 47.

    Google Scholar 

  146. Hoffmann, P./ Ramke, R. (1992), p. 37.

    Google Scholar 

  147. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Chiplin, B./ Albrighton, M. (2000), p. 149.

    Google Scholar 

  148. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Thompson, S. (1991), pp. 48–49.

    Google Scholar 

  149. Schwien, B. (1995), p. 26.

    Google Scholar 

  150. Schmid, H. (1994), p. 89.

    Google Scholar 

  151. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Thompson, S. (1991), p. 53.

    Google Scholar 

  152. Baruch, Y./ Gebbie, D. (1998), pp. 423–424.

    Google Scholar 

  153. Wright, M./ Coyne, J./ Mills, A. (1987), p. 99. However, increasingly larger exit values of buyouts, higher listing costs, and decreasing liquidity at the USM after the stock market crash in 1987 led to a growing number of listings on the LSE, Wright, M./Chiplin, B./Robbie, K. (1989), p. 25.

    Google Scholar 

  154. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Chiplin, B./ Albrighton, M. (2000), pp. 156–157.

    Google Scholar 

  155. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Thompson, S. (1991), p. 48; Wright, M./Robbie, K./Chiplin, B./Albrighton, M. (2000), p. 154.

    Google Scholar 

  156. Baruch, Y./ Gebbie, D. (1998), p. 424.

    Google Scholar 

  157. Kitching, J. (1989), p. 4.

    Google Scholar 

  158. Wright, M./ Thompson, S./ Robbie, K. (1992), p. 48.

    Google Scholar 

  159. Baruch, Y./ Gebbie, D. (1998), p. 424; Wright, M./Robbie, K./Chiplin, B./Albrighton, M. (2000), pp. 159–160.

    Google Scholar 

  160. Rogers, P./ Holland, T./ Haas, D. (2002), p. 98; Wright, M./Robbie, K./Chiplin, B./Albrighton, M. (2000), p. 161.

    Google Scholar 

  161. CMBOR (2003), pp. 9–10.

    Google Scholar 

  162. Precise data on the German buyout market is very difficult to obtain, mainly due to the lack of an institution for systematic data collection and also the private nature of buyout transactions. SCHMID concludes that at least 173 buyout transactions were closed in Germany by the end of 1992, see Schmid, H. (1994), p. 74.

    Google Scholar 

  163. For more details, see Cable, J. (1985).

    Google Scholar 

  164. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Thompson, S. (1991), p. 48.

    Google Scholar 

  165. For a more detailed overview of reasons, see Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 125–127.

    Google Scholar 

  166. Berger, M. (1993), p. 43; Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 167–170.

    Google Scholar 

  167. Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 187–188.

    Google Scholar 

  168. Forst, M. (1992), pp. 134–135; Luippold, T.L. (1991), p. 123.

    Google Scholar 

  169. Wright, M./ Robbie, K./ Thompson, S. (1991), pp. 50–51.

    Google Scholar 

  170. Gros, S.E. (1998), p. 155; Laub, J. (1995), p. 2. See also Oelsnitz, D. v.d. (1993).

    Google Scholar 

  171. Indahl, R./ Zinterhofer, E. (1998), p. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  172. Luippold, T.L. (1991), pp. 157–159; Neukirchen, D. (1996), p. 13.

    Google Scholar 

  173. Honert, J. (1995), pp. 23–24.

    Google Scholar 

  174. CMBOR (2003), p. 92.

    Google Scholar 

  175. BRAUN develops a model consisting of five factors (i.e., culture/mentality, entrepreneurship, M&A activities, financial markets, law/taxes), which have a significant influence on the development of buyout markets, Braun, C. (1989), pp. 69–73.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

(2008). Introduction to buyouts. In: German Buyouts Adopting a Buy and Build Strategy. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9634-3_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation