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Abstract

This chapter provides a summary of key information about the buyout phenomenon. It contains a definition and a delineation of different types of buyouts, an overview of key participants in the buyout market, and also an outline of the historic development in relevant buyout markets.

Keywords

Capital Structure Private Equity Gross National Product Future Cash Flow Target Company 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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