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Abstract

Strategic management is the process of continuously adapting to changes in a firm’s external and internal environment in order to ensure its long-term survival and growth.23 To better understand their environment and to derive the strategic relevance of changes for their organization, middle and top executives have to make sense of “weak signals”.24 They have to understand how relevant the indicated changes are for their organization, whether they could become “strategic issues”,25 and finally have to decide on a response strategy.

Keywords

Mental Model Organizational Member Management Accounting Radical Learning Management Control System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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