As already discussed in the section on economic theory, organizations can only survive through maintaining the fit between the company and its environment by actively adapting the strategies to new environmental conditions. Due to compressed life cycles, fragmenting markets, and developments in media and distribution channels, this adaptation is becoming increasingly difficult.191 Based on the assumptions of cognitive theory, this adaptation has to be preceded by the process of sensemaking: “[...] Data mean nothing until they are used by organization participants. [...] When managers observe an external event, the information cue may be ambiguous and have several interpretations. [...] Managers organize cues and messages into meaningful patterns by imposing interpretations”.192 Day adds that recent developments in information technology have shifted the interest from data quantity to the question of how to process the huge amount of available data and how to make sense of a more and more complex world. Thus the interest in the process of sensemaking has increased: “Recent developments in information technology can deliver more timely and detailed data, but the ensuing avalanche of numbers often smothers the collective ability to make sense out of that data. Since more data is not an answer, firms are looking to the underlying processes used to learn about their markets”.193 Strategic sensemaking allows people to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity as it creates “clear questions and clear answers”194 that are the prerequisite for strategic decision-making.


Team Member Political Behavior Relationship Conflict Individual Manager Task Conflict 
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