Abstract
Literature that can be subsumed under strategic decision-making is very broad and diverse and has been growing massively especially since 1980.33 At the risk of gross simplification the literature on strategic decision-making can roughly be divided into two main streams of theoretical schools: the content and the process school.34 Whereas the content school focuses on the antecedents and consequences of strategic change, hence on the question what managers should decide, the process school concentrates on the question how managers come to these decisions, i.e. analyzes the role of managers in the strategic decision processes. Both schools try to shed light on strategic management, which “[...] can be defined as the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of managerial actions that enhance the value of a business enterprise”.35
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References
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See Schwenk (1995), p. 471; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996), p. 48.
Teece (1990), p. 40. Although Mintzberg stresses, that “strategic management cannot afford to rely on a single definition of strategy” (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 25), this definition was chosen because it frames the following discussion.
Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996) use the term “rational” whereas Huff, Huff and Barr (2000) and Nelson (1991) use the term “economic theory” to describe theories which are based on the traditional neoclassical economic theories.
Nelson (1991), p. 64.
Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), p. 3.
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Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), p. 13.
Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), p. 13.
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Kim (2001), p. 21. Other researchers use the same idea, but use the term “knowledge structure” (Walsh, 1995), “belief structures” (Beyer et al., 1997), or “cognitive schema” (Elsbach, Barr and Hargadon, 2005).
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Miller and Ireland (2005), p. 21. The term “automated expertise” is also used by Simon (1987), whereas Crossan, Lane and White (1999) use the term “expert intuition”, Burke and Miller (1999) use the term “subconscious mental processing” and Khatri and Ng (2000) use “intuitive synthesis”.
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See Haley and Stumpf (1989), p. 485. Wagner and Gooding (1997), p. 284 further propose that managers tend to be overconfident in evaluating their own achievements and tend to underestimate competitors.
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Daft and Weick (1984), p. 285.
Kim (1993), pp. 43. Other researchers use the term “dominant logic” (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), “organizational memory” (Huber, 1991), “organizational schemas” (Harris, 1994), “collective constructs” (Morgeson and Hofmann, 1999), “organizational memory” (Kim, 2001), or “collective personality” (Hoffmann and Jones, 2005).
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Prahalad and Bettis (1986), p. 485.
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Hodgkinson et al. (1999).
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See Mintzberg (1990b), p. 166. Researchers discussed the tension between refining and extending existing competences and strategies vs. the experimentation with new options as “exploitation vs. exploration” see for example March (1991), Crossan, Lane and White (1999).
See Hofstede (1980) for the effect of regional culture, Schneider (1989) for national cultures and Schein (1996) for an analysis of subcultures within an organization.
Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), p. 24 argue, that organizational learning is often focused on actual changes of mental models and therefore used the term “knowledge acquisition and use” to mark a less restrictive definition that also incorporated a confirmation of existing mental models without change.
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See Huber (1991), Kim (1993).
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Crossan et al. (1995), p. 338.
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“All learning takes place inside human heads; an organization learns in only two ways: (a) by the learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting new members who have knowledge the organization didn‘t’ previously have” (Simon, 1991, p. 125).
Seely-Brown (1993) emphasize that learning happens in groups with most of it occurring in a social context.
Several theorists stress that organizational learning does not only take place on the individual and group level but that there is also a role for the organization. Researchers for example propose an influence of organizational systems, structures, and procedures (Fiol and Lyles, 1985) or that organizational learning is stored within these systems, structures and procedures (Hedberg, 1981).
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Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), p. 21.
Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), p. 29.
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Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), p. 30.
Pettigrew, Woodman and Cameron (2001), p. 709.
See Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), p. 21. 178 Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005), p. 409.
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Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), p. 25.
See Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), pp. 21.
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See Schneider and Angelmar (1993), p. 353; Walsh (1995), p. 308; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996), p. 66; Hodgkinson et al. (1999), p. 978.
See Ginsberg (1994), p. 153; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996), p. 66.
Ginsberg (1994), p. 153.
Mintzberg (1990b), pp. 145. See also Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998), p. 172: Cognitive theory “[...] is characterized more by its potential than its contribution”, or Hodgkinson et al. (1999), p. 977, who concludes that research results of cognitive theory analyses are difficult to translate into practical advices: “[...] there have been few published attempts to rigorously evaluate the efficacy of these procedures for practical use in applied settings”.
See Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992), pp. 32.
See Wood and Bandura (1989), p. 380; Schwenk (1995), p. 489; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996), p. 70; Huff, Huff and Barr (2000), pp. 14.
Wood and Bandura (1989), p. 380. See also Schwenk (1988a), p. 53
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(2008). Cognitive Theory — The Theoretical Foundation of Strategic Sensemaking. In: The Effect of Managerial Experiences on Strategic Sensemaking. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9632-9_2
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