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Cognitive Theory — The Theoretical Foundation of Strategic Sensemaking

Abstract

Literature that can be subsumed under strategic decision-making is very broad and diverse and has been growing massively especially since 1980.33 At the risk of gross simplification the literature on strategic decision-making can roughly be divided into two main streams of theoretical schools: the content and the process school.34 Whereas the content school focuses on the antecedents and consequences of strategic change, hence on the question what managers should decide, the process school concentrates on the question how managers come to these decisions, i.e. analyzes the role of managers in the strategic decision processes. Both schools try to shed light on strategic management, which “[...] can be defined as the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of managerial actions that enhance the value of a business enterprise”.35

Keywords

Theoretical Foundation Mental Model Cognitive Theory Organizational Learning Behavioral Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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