Family firms and executive pay

  • Joern Block


The chapter analyzes the structure of executive pay in family and non-family firms. It is connected to the overall research question of long-term orientation in family firms in that incentive pay is regarded as a source of myopic managerial behavior. If family firms indeed pursue more longterm goals, this should be reflected in the structure of executive pay. Accordingly, there should be a low share of short-term incentive pay and a high proportion of base salary in total pay.


Family Firm Quantile Regression Stock Option Family Ownership Median Regression 
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© Gabler | GWV Fachverlage GmbH 2009

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  • Joern Block

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