Legal and Economic Analysis of Parallel Imports

  • Frank Müller-Langer

In this chapter, we develop a simple double marginalization model with complete information, in which an original manufacturer of a pharmaceutical product faces potential competition from parallel imports by a foreign exclusive distributor. The model suggests that parallel imports will never occur in the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, as it will always be beneficial for the manufacturer to monopolize the home country by undercutting the price of the re-imported pharmaceutical product. However, the question as to whether it is optimal for the manufacturer to charge the monopoly price in the home country depends on the level of trade costs and the level of heterogeneity of the two countries, in terms of market size and price elasticity of demand.


European Union Pharmaceutical Product Consumer Surplus Trade Cost Wholesale Price 
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Copyright information

© Gabler | GWV Fachverlage GmbH 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frank Müller-Langer

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