Economic Analysis of Patents

  • Frank Müller-Langer

In the first part of this chapter, we will review the underlying economic theory as to patent protection and R&D incentives. More specifically, we will focus on patent races, the deadweight loss on monopolistic markets associated with patents, and the tragedy of the anticommons. In particular, we will contribute to the formal literature on the tragedy of the anticommons by generalizing the model originally formulated by Schulz et al. (2002).


Nash Equilibrium Price Discrimination Deadweight Loss Pharmaceutical Firm Trips Agreement 
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© Gabler | GWV Fachverlage GmbH 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frank Müller-Langer

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