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Incentives for Sports Corruption

  • Cedric Duvinage
Part of the Management, Organisation und ökonomische Analyse book series (MOÖA, volume 14)

Abstract

The apparent loophole in the present regulations provided by state law compels sports associations to themselves deal with the issue of sports corruption, which only arises as a result of an agency problem. Even though a sports association can typically observe and evaluate a referee’s objective performance, it can not observe whether a referee made an error deliberately or only unconsciously.

Keywords

Expected Payoff High Effort Effort Cost Incentive Contract Winning Probability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Gabler Verlag | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Cedric Duvinage

There are no affiliations available

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