Advertisement

Analyzing and Improving the Security of Internet Elections

  • Adam Wierzbicki
  • Krzystof Pietrzak

Abstract

Internet elections are one of the tools of eGovernment that seems a natural application of the increasingly ubiquitous computer networks. The possibility of voting from your own home would decrease the costs of elections, and as a consequence, elections could be carried out more frequently. This would increase the participation of citizens in the democratic state, enabling a transition from a representational to a direct democracy. Yet, Internet elections are vulnerable to a large number of security threats, and the risk of failing to provide security is the disruption of democratic society. For this reason, many previous attempts to provide Internet elections have failed, and their use has been discouraged by security experts. In this article, the conclusions of previous security analyses — the SERVE security report and the experiences from the Estonian Internet elections — are updated to take into account recent technological developments. The article presents new methods that can be used to increase the security of Internet elections.

Keywords

Virtual Machine Direct Democracy Security Expert Electronic Vote Eligible Voter 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. [1]
    D. Jefferson, A. Rubin, B. Simons, D, Wagner et. al; “Analyzing Internet Voting Security”; Communications of the ACM; October 2004, vo. 47, no. 10, pp. 59–64Google Scholar
  2. [2]
    D. Jefferson, A. Rubin, B. Simons, D, Wagner; “A Security Analysis of the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE)”; January, 2004; www.servesecurityreport.orgGoogle Scholar
  3. [3]
    Estonia to hold first national Internet election; Reuters; February 21, 2007Google Scholar
  4. [4]
    Glosowanie przez Internet, a project of “Polska Mlodych”, 2007, Poland, http://www.polskamlodych.pl/Google Scholar
  5. [5]
    A. Pach, Schemat rozwiazania evoting, an opinion for “Polska Mlodych”, 2007, Poland, http:// wwwpolskamlodych.pl/dokumenty/schemat_rozwiazan.pdfGoogle Scholar
  6. [6]
    M. Kutyłowski, Opinia na temat projektu glosowania przez Internet Stowarzyszenia Polska Mlodych, 2007, http: //www.polskamlodych.pl/dokumenty/opiniakutylowski.pdfGoogle Scholar
  7. [7]
    Stanowisko w sprawie glosowania elektronicznego w wyborach powszechnych, Internet Society Poland, 2007, http://www.isoc.org.pl/200701/wyboryGoogle Scholar
  8. [8]
    T. Magi, Practical Security Analysis of Evoting Systems, Master thesis, Tallin University of Technology, 2007Google Scholar
  9. [9]
    Estonian National Electoral Committee; General Description of the Evoting System; 2004; http://www.wk.ee/elektr/docs/Yldkirjeldus-02.pdfGoogle Scholar
  10. [10]
    C. Drew, U.S. Bars Lab From Testing Electronic Voting, The New York Times, January 4, 2007; http: //www. ny times. com/2007/01 /04/washington/04voting. htmlGoogle Scholar
  11. [11]
    Risk Assessment Report Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System and Processes, September 2, 2003, http://www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/votingsystemreportfinal.pdfGoogle Scholar
  12. [12]
    Clint Curtis, haslo w Wikipedii, Wolnej Encyklopedii: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clint_CurtisGoogle Scholar
  13. [13]
    A. Zwierno and Z. Kotulski, A Light-Weight e-Voting System with Distributed Trust, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science168 2007 109–126CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn Verlag | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Adam Wierzbicki
    • 1
  • Krzystof Pietrzak
    • 1
  1. 1.Polish-Japanese Institute of Information TechnologyPoland

Personalised recommendations