Future of Assurance: Ensuring that a System is Trustworthy

Abstract

Significant efforts are put in defining and implementing strong security measures for all components of the comput-ing environment. It is equally important to be able to evaluate the strength and robustness of these measures and establish trust among the components of the computing environment based on parameters and attributes of these elements and best practices associated with their production and deployment. Today the inventory of techniques used for security assurance and to establish trust -- audit, security-conscious development process, cryptographic components, external evaluation – is somewhat limited. These methods have their indisputable strengths and have contributed significantly to the advancement in the area of security assurance. However, shorter product and tech-nology development cycles and the sheer complexity of modern digital systems and processes have begun to decrease the efficiency of these techniques. Moreover, these approaches and technologies address only some aspects of security assurance and, for the most part, evaluate assurance in a general design rather than an instance of a product. Additionally, various components of the computing environment participating in the same processes enjoy different levels of security assurance, making it difficult to ensure adequate levels of protection end-to-end. Finally, most evaluation methodologies rely on the knowledge and skill of the evaluators, making reliable assessments of trustworthiness of a system even harder to achieve. The paper outlines some issues in security assurance that apply across the board, with the focus on the trustworthiness and authenticity of hardware components and evaluates current approaches to assurance.