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Trusted ← Trustworthy ← Proof Position Paper

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Abstract

Trusted computing is important, but we argue that it remains an illusion as long as the underlying trusted computing base (TCB) is not trustworthy. We observe that present approaches to trusted computing do not really address this issue, but are trusting TCBs which have not been shown to deserve this trust. We argue that only mathematical proof can ensure the trustworthiness of the TCB. In short: trust requires trustworthiness, which in turn requires proof. We also show that this is achievable.

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David Gawrock Helmut Reimer Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Claire Vishik

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© 2009 Vieweg+Teubner | GWV Fachverlage GmbH

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Heiser, G. (2009). Trusted ← Trustworthy ← Proof Position Paper. In: Gawrock, D., Reimer, H., Sadeghi, AR., Vishik, C. (eds) Future of Trust in Computing. Vieweg+Teubner. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-9324-6_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-9324-6_6

  • Publisher Name: Vieweg+Teubner

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-8348-0794-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-8348-9324-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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