Hardware Security Features for Secure Embedded Devices

  • Helena Handschuh
  • Elena Trichina


Secure embedded Devices for the mobile, financial and automotive markets require more and more security features to resist today’s field attacks. At the software level, side-channel attacks such as timing attacks, power attacks, electro-magnetic attacks and radio-frequency attacks on embedded devices have been described for a number of years now, and numerous adequate security countermeasures have been published and implemented by most manufacturers. At the hardware level, the story is completely different. Manufacturers have been aware of physical security issues and invasive/side-channel attacks for quite some time, but protecting embedded chips against such attacks requires quite some architectural knowledge and needs to be addressed at the design level. Countermeasures can hardly be added after the fact.


Smart Card Logic Gate Advance Encryption Standard Embed Device Modular Exponentiation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn Verlag | GWV-Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Helena Handschuh
    • 1
  • Elena Trichina
    • 2
  1. 1.Spansion EMEALevallois-PerretFrance
  2. 2.Spansion International Inc.MunichGermany

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