Physical Unclonable Functions for enhanced security of tokens and tags
Security tokens and RFID-tags are playing an increasingly important role in the authentication of persons and devices, e.g. controlling access to services and protecting the value of goods and digital content. In order to provide the required security level they are used in combination with a cryptographic algorithm. State of the art algorithms are so sophisticated nowadays that they are virtually immune against mathematical attacks. Hence, the offered security level essentially depends on the secrecy of the employed keys. Several studies have shown that the secrecy of keys stored in memory is not guaranteed when physical attacks are used.
Recently, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) were introduced as an identification tool to build secure tokens. In this paper, we extend this setting and show how PUFs can be used for generating and storing keys in a way that is secure even against physical attacks. This enables new strong security devices such as unclonable tokens, secure key storage devices and unclonable REID-tags. These are briefly described together with some applications.
KeywordsTrusted Platform Module Enrolment Phase Cryptographic Algorithm Physical Attack Physical Unclonable Function
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