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General Conditions Surrounding Non-Commercial Services

  • Arne Beck
Chapter
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Abstract

This section begins with a description of tendering’s basic structure and awarding schedule. Section 7.2 then focuses on barriers to market entry and the relevance of uncertainty. In Sect. 7.3 I examine the structural differences of risk factors and typical forms of risk allocation based on a study of 34 public service contracts in Europe. Section 7.4 expands the discussion on revenue risk with respect to Germany. I conclude with a summary of the main economic effects of risk within tendering procedures in Sect. 7.5.

Keywords

Risk Premium Market Entry Demand Potential Winning Bidder Management Contract 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arne Beck
    • 1
  1. 1.BerlinGermany

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