Abstract
Being a late-late industrializing country, Korea carefully designed a unique model of technological catch-up led by a ‘developmental state’ (Johnson 1982) and spearheaded by chaebol. The model became operational in two distinct but mutually reinforcing phases: first, an imitation-driven GRI System based on reverse engineering of foreign technologies; and second, a chaebol-led, private sector funded system of corporate R&D. During both phases, an uninterrupted inflow of foreign technology to Korea was supported by Cold War era ‘strategic constraints’ to maintain the U.S.-led ‘alliance system’ aimed at containing the perceived Soviet threat. The dynamic interplay between foreign technology and indigenous R&D efforts paved the way for Korea to substantially bridge its technological divide with the developed world, particularly in the manufacturing sector.1 Korean products from ships to chips, from computers to semiconductors acquired global recognition. Reflecting fierce competition with technologically advanced economies, the R&D budget of Korea has witnessed a phenomenal rise2.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Korea launched its Highly Advanced National (HAN) Project in 1992, which was supposed to be a springboard for Korea to catch up with advanced nations. It funded 18 teams conducting research on areas diverse as agrochemicals and nuclear fusion. Although the results have helped Korean companies to commercialize such products as high-definition television sets and 256-MB DRAM chips, the project fell short in other areas, including fusion and high-speed rail transportation.
- 2.
Korea spent about KRW34.5 trillion (USD28 billion) in 2008 on research and development, up 10.2% from 2007. R&D spending now accounts for 3.37% of gross domestic product, placing South Korea sixth among 30 OECD member states. For details see, Song Sang Ho, “R&D spending jumped 10% last year”, Korea Herald, 16 September 2009.
- 3.
The Korean financial crisis coincided with the inauguration of the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) candidate Kim Dae-jung’s government, which came to power based on policies committed to rectifying wealth concentration and regional development imbalances. As ‘DJnomics’ took center stage in Korea, the locus of political power shifted away from its traditional Gyeongsang-do seat in the southeast part of the peninsula to Jeolla-do in the southwest.
- 4.
Budget allocation in different scientific areas indicates future technological orientation. By type of technologies, 33.8% of the total was invested in information technology while the investments in nanotechnology, biotechnology and environment technology accounted for 12.3%, 7.6% and 8.5%, respectively.
- 5.
For the details regarding the ‘techno-scientific sphere’ and ‘techno-industrial spheres,’ see Hilpert U (ed) (1991) State policies and techno-industrial innovation. Routledge, London/New York.
- 6.
- 7.
For details see Eros and Park (1989).
- 8.
In the early years of industrialization, firms in the developing countries import/or imitate mature technologies, whose products have already been tested in the advanced countries. Large firms acquire production technologies mainly through turnkey plants or foreign licenses. In contrast, small firms take an imitative approach with reverse engineering of foreign products as the core strategy and evolve organically over a long period of time. R&D in a sense of generating new technologies is not needed during the initial phase of industrialization. Korea’s first phase of industrialization was no exception to this general trend.
- 9.
KIST alone could not respond to the increasing demand from expanding industries. Thus, the Korean government established many GRIs under related ministries in order to meet immediate R&D demands from export-oriented strategic industries. As a result, 14 institutes in the S&T area had been founded by the end of the 1970s, mainly as spin-offs from KIST and other institutes. For details, see Lim (2000).
- 10.
Other government-funded research institutes include Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology (GIST) founded in 1993; Korea Institute for Advanced Study (KIAS), 1996; and Information and Communications University (ICU), 1998.
- 11.
A case in point involves polyester film production for use in cassette tapes. When a Japanese company rejected Korea’s request for technology transfer, for fear of losing its market in Korea, a Korean chemical firm in collaboration with KIST successfully undertook a reverse engineering task to invent around the production technology. At that time, Korea recognized process patents but not the product patents. Soon KIST had invented around the technology. When the Japanese company offered a transfer agreement, the Korean government rejected it in order to protect domestically developed technology. Korea now is the world’s major supplier for audio and videocassettes tapes.
- 12.
Korea’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) was later renamed Ministry of Education, Science & Technology (MEST).
- 13.
For details see Choi (1988).
- 14.
Korea Institute of Industrial Technology (KITECH) launched the Korea Advanced Manufacturing Systems (KAMS) Project in 1992 with support from the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy and the Ministry of Science and Technology. Consequently, Korea has gained a competitive edge in various high-tech industrial sectors such as semiconductors, consumer electronics, telecom equipment, etc.
- 15.
The ‘post-developmental state’ in Korea has been referred to by some scholars as the ‘new techno-economic state,’ which contrary to the popular belief, did not transform into a ‘neo-liberal state,’ rather old interventionist policies shifted focus from promoting chaebol to encouraging universities to widen the social base for economic development. For details, see Uttam 2005.
- 16.
As of 1985, the five largest chaebol constituted 20.4% of Korea’s total manufacturing sector assets. For further details, see Dong-song CHO, Hanguk Chaebol Yongu [A Study of the Korean Chaebol]. Seoul: Maeil Gyeongje Sinmunsa, 1991.
- 17.
The sharp division in Korea between ‘conservatives’ supporting ‘developmental state’ politics and policies and ‘progressives’ arguing for a ‘post-developmental state’ and a ‘mass-participatory’ economy polarized public opinion in the post-1997 crisis period.
- 18.
The idea of participatory democracy was already developed before Kim Dae-jung took office. He asserted the need for democratization to tackle economic problems related to Korea’s unbalanced concentration of industrial output, labor distribution, and regional growth in his book Daejung Gyeongjeron [Mass-participatory Economy] (Seoul: Chongsa 1986).
- 19.
In Phase-I, from 1999 to 2005, BK-21 allocated about USD1.4 billion in funding. Phase-II, which began in 2006 and is scheduled to run through 2012, allocates and additional of USD2.1 billion.
References
Cho D (1991) Hanguk chaebol yongu [A study of the Korean chaebol]. Maeil Kyongje Sinmunsa, Seoul
Cho D, Kim D, Rhee D (1998) Latecomer strategies: evidence from the semiconductor industry in Japan and Korea. Organ Sci 9(4):489–505
Choi HS (1984) Industrial research in less developed countries. ESCAP, Regional Centre for Technology Transfer, Bangalore
Choi HS (1988) Direction for technological self reliance: Korean approach. Technol Forecast Soc Change 33:23–32
Chu DY (1992) Bondoche Sanup eui Keupkyukhan Byunwha wa Urieui Daeung [Rapid changes in the semiconductor industry and our response]. Korea Maekyung Press, Seoul
Chung S (1999) Unification of National Innovation Systems: How Should it be Different between Germany and Korea?, Science and Technology Policy Institute, Seoul, Korea
Dosi G (ed) (1988) Technical change and economic theory. Printer, London
Eros JL, Park WH (1989) The adoption and diffusion of imported technology. Croom Helm, New York
Freeman C (1987) Technology and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, London: Pinter
Johnson C (1982) MITI and the Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy 1925-1975. Stanford University Press, Stanford
Kim D (1986) Daejung Gyeongjeron [Mass-participatory economy]. Chongsa, Seoul
Kim L-S (1997) Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological Learning, Boston, Massachusetts, Harvard Business School Press
Kim L, Lee J (1997) Korea’s entry into the computer industry and its acquisition of technological capability. Technovation 6:277–293
Kim L (1999) Learning and innovation in economic development. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Kim, Linsu (2003) “Crisis, Reform, and national Innovation in south Korea,” (pp.86–107), in William W. Keller and Richard J. Samuels (ed.), Crisis and Innovation in Asian Technology, Cambridge Online Books
Lee C (2005) Korea’s national innovation system . Proceedings of the ASIALICS 2nd international conference, Jeju, Korea, 17–20 Apr 2005
Lim Y (2000) Development of the public sector in the Korean innovation system. Int J Technol Manage 20(5/6/7/8):684–701
Lundvall B (1992) National systems of innovation: towards a theory of innovation and interactive learning. Pinter, London
Mahlich J, Pascha W (2007) Innovation and technology in Korea: challenges of a newly advanced economy. Physica, Heidelberg
Nelson R (1993) National innovation systems: a comparative analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford
OECD (1999) Managing national innovation systems. OECD, Paris
Patel P, Pavitt K (1994) The nature and economic importance of the national innovation system, STI review 14. OECD, Paris
Samsung Electronics (1989) Samsung Jeonja Ishipnyunsa [Samsung Electronics twenty-years]. Seoul, Korea
Shin T, Kim H (1994) Research foresight activities and technological development in Korea: science and technology policies in national R&D programs. Technol Forecast Soc Change 9(1):31–45
Song SH (2009) R&D spending jumped 10 percent last year, Korea Herald, 16 Sept 2009
Suh JH (2000) Korea’s innovation system: challenges and new policy agenda. Paper presented at INTECK, United Nations University, 2000-4, Maastricht, 7–10 Nov 2000
Uttam, Jitendra (2006) Korea’s New Techno-Scientific State: Mapping a Strategic Change in the ‘Developmental State’, China Report (42)3:257–268
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Uttam, J. (2012). Korea’s New Techno-Scientific Strategy: Realigning State, Market and Society to Move Beyond Technological Catch-Up. In: Mahlich, J., Pascha, W. (eds) Korean Science and Technology in an International Perspective. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2753-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2753-8_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-2752-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-7908-2753-8
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)