Governance Variety in the Energy Service Contracting Market
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the DIME Workshop “The Changing Governance of Network Industries”, Naples, 29–30 April 2010, at the 1st DIME Scientific Conference “Knowledge in space and time: economic and policy implications of the knowledge-based economy” in Strasbourg, 7–9 April 2008 and at the 9th IAEE European Energy Conference “Energy Markets and Sustainability in a Larger Europe” in Florence, 10–13 June 2007.
KeywordsGovernance Structure Public Building Relative Risk Ratio Transaction Cost Economic Asset Specificity
This paper is an outcome of the research project “Diffusion of innovations in energy efficiency and in climate change mitigation in the public and private sector”. We wish to thank the Volkswagen Foundation for the financial support of this project, the Verband für Wärmelieferung for the data provided and our colleagues Krisztina Kis-Katos and Joachim Schleich for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. The authors are solely responsible for remaining mistakes and weaknesses.
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