Towards a More General Theory of Franchise Governance

  • Seth W. Norton
Part of the Contributions to Management Science book series (MANAGEMENT SC.)


This chapter examines the nature of franchising and various business practices in terms of economic governance systems. Markets versus hierarchies, problems of collective action, and tournaments and adaptive imitation are linked to alternative types of franchise organization using established franchising taxonomies and previous research on franchise organization. Common activities of franchised operations are examined in light of governance systems. The chapter highlights some of the comparative advantages of alternative governance systems. The chapter also includes some implications for marketing channel strategy.


Public Good Collective Action Governance System Price Mechanism Governance Arrangement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Seth W. Norton
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Business and EconomicsWheaton CollegeWheatonUSA

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