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Introducing ‘Economics and Management of Franchising Networks’

  • George W. J. Hendrikse
  • Josef Windsperger
Part of the Contributions to Management Science book series (MANAGEMENT SC.)

Abstract

The increasing economic significance of networks has fuelled rapid growth in research at the intersection of economic and management disciplines (Brickley et al. 2002; Hendrikse 2003). The first international conference on Economics and Management of Networks (EMNET) took place at the Center for Business Studies, University of Vienna, from June 26 to June 28, 2003..EMNET-conferences should serve in promoting communication and awareness among researchers in economics and management and should provide a forum to present current research and to discuss issues of common interest, such as relevant developments in organizational economics and management. The content of future conferences will include all forms of networks, such as franchising, joint ventures, virtual organizations, strategic alliances, cooperatives, clusters, venture capital relations and other forms of hybrids.

Keywords

Entry Mode Business Format Plural Form Entry Mode Choice Franchise System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • George W. J. Hendrikse
    • 1
  • Josef Windsperger
    • 2
  1. 1.Erasmus University Rotterdam Rotterdam School of ManagementRotterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Center for Business Studies University of ViennaViennaAustria

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