The Moral Science of Heterogeneous Economic Interaction in Face of Complexity

  • Yuji Aruka


The principles of political economy, particularly those of the Anglo-Saxon origin, were kinds of utilitarian-based moral philosophy. In this sense, the idea of individualistic rational utility is the essential ontological factor of empiricism to generate the source of all human behaviour in the economic system. Thus, many economists have so far been inclined to indulge in an individualistic utility-based prediction, almost everywhere that human nature matters. While the Schumpeterian epistemological view of the continental idealisms is construed as the triangular theoretical layers of statics, dynamics, and sociodynamics. Without any modification of the ontological–epistemological constructs in economics, we can no longer capture the essence of the rapidly salient evolution of complex economic systems in the modern times.


Utility Function Transition Rate Master Equation Multinomial Logit Model Sequential Choice 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of CommerceChuo UniversityTokyoJapan

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