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An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Interaction: Introduction to Socio- and Econo-Physics

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Complexities of Production and Interacting Human Behaviour
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Abstract

We try to construct an evolutionary theory of economic and social interaction of heterogeneous agents. Modern physics is helpful for such an attempt, as the recent flourishing of econophysics exemplifies. In this article, we are interested in a specific or more fundamental use of physics rather than in the recent researches of econophysics. In the first part of this article, we mainly focus on the traditional von Neumann-Sraffa model of production as complex adaptive system and examine the measure of complexity on this model in view of thermodynamical ideas. We then suggest the idea of hierarchical inclusion on this model to define complexity of production. In the latter part, we try to construct an elementary theory of social interaction of heterogeneous agents in view of statistical mechanics.

Reprinted from Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 2(2). Aruka, Y., An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Interaction: Introduction to Socio- and Econo-physics, 145–160 (2007). With kind permission from Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics, Tokyo.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The multinomial logit model can be compatible with the sequential choice model, as Luce model (Luce 1959) suggested. The multinomial logit model has a comprehensively generic feature either to be derived from the random utility model or the Luce model. See Bierlaire (1997) for details.

  2. 2.

    Bounded rationality may be given in view of the failure of estimation on the secondary effects. If we had some subpopulation which failed to catch up with the secondary effects of the interaction, the opponent subpopulation should rather utilize the failure of the former for its advantages.

  3. 3.

    The multi-armed bandit problem (See Bellman 1961), as Holland (1992, Chap. 5) referred to is a good example that optimization should fail. Our permissible option in such an environment that the problem is faced with is limited to the way of risk minimization.

  4. 4.

    This section is a concise version of Aruka and Mimkes (2005).

  5. 5.

    S represents the different possibilities for production activities (processes). And we later find \( S = \ln P \). In a finite system of N elements the number of possibilities may be calculated by the law of combinations \( P = N!/N \).

  6. 6.

    Aruka and Mimkes (2005), by the use of von Neumann-Sraffa model of production (von Neumann 1937, Sraffa 1960), attained to the next result:

    Theorem 1. The probability of multiple truncations compatible with a given rate of interest r must be augmented if the number of truncations increases in the range of \( g \leq r \). Average welfare could then be risen by a hierarchical inclusion of a single process operation of higher profitability, i.e., by an increase of complexity.

  7. 7.

    We can easily prove the next proposition: With groups of sizes \( {x_1},{x_2}, \cdots, {x_n} \) adding to \( G = \sum\nolimits_i^n {x_i} \), the average size is \( \frac{{{x_i}}}{G} \). The chance of an individual belonging to group \( 1\; is \;\frac{{{x_1}}}{G} \). The expected size of the group is \( E(x) = x_1\frac{{{x_1}}}{G} + \cdots + x_n\frac{x_n}{G} \). Hence it then holds that \( \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{n} \frac{{{x^2_i}}}{G} \ge \frac{G}{n}. \)

  8. 8.

    Robert Frank loves to discuss plentiful discussions on this kind. See Frank (1988).

  9. 9.

    Recently, “pessimistic subjectivity” is taken account of in the theory of expected utility theory. The theory of this type is called Choquet expected utility theory. But we rather are interested in the interaction of heterogeneous agents. See Bassett et al. (2004), for example.

  10. 10.

    Finally, we must notice another point. Even in a society where there are only 24 persons, we always are faced with too many menu lists on type-size allocation when we must select. Suppose we always given an initial allocation of types. We can then always hold the initial allocation as a status quo(standstill) policy. In the case of Nash bargaining, the allocation is called the threat or impasse point.

  11. 11.

    \( \frac{{\partial L}}{{\partial {N_i}}} = 0 \) implies \( {E_i} - T \left(\ln \frac{N}{{{N_i}}} - \ln \frac{{{V_i}}}{V}\right) = 0 \). Hence \( \ln \frac{N}{{{N_i}}}\frac{{{V_i}}}{V} = - \frac{{{E_i}}}{T} \).

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Aruka, Y., Mimkes, J. (2011). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Interaction: Introduction to Socio- and Econo-Physics. In: Aruka, Y. (eds) Complexities of Production and Interacting Human Behaviour. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2618-0_4

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