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A Perspective for Analyzing the Socio-Economic System and Interactive Human Behaviour

  • Yuji Aruka
Chapter

Abstract

We should distinguish freedom from randomness, particularly in a socio-economic system as Mainzer (2007) has systematically envisaged. As econophysics has successfully proved the properties of power law as well as lognormal distribution in an actual socio-economic system, we also are faced with a much higher probability of unfair or nonegalitarian consequences for equal opportunities. This belief of a free market system should be studied. We briefly look at a recent idea of complex networks to characterize a distribution of systems.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Preferential Attachment Final Demand Reaction Curve Efficient Market Hypothesis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of CommerceChuo UniversityTokyoJapan

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