Incentives and Control in Company-Owned Versus Franchised Outlets: An Empirical Study at the Chain Level
In this article, we investigate the relative performances of company-owned outlets vs. franchised outlets using an original database consisting of 231 units of a French chain. At first glance, the financial and quality performances of company-owned units are better than franchised units. However, the opposite is true when the particular characteristics of each unit are considered in account in the analysis.
KeywordsGovernance Structure Pure Strategy Satisfaction Rate Governance Mechanism Store Manager
We thank the reviewers for their helpful comments. Usual caveats apply.
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