Incentives and Control in Company-Owned Versus Franchised Outlets: An Empirical Study at the Chain Level

  • Didier Chabaud
  • Arnaud Lavit d’ Hautefort
  • Stéphane Saussier
Part of the Contributions to Management Science book series (MANAGEMENT SC.)


In this article, we investigate the relative performances of company-owned outlets vs. franchised outlets using an original database consisting of 231 units of a French chain. At first glance, the financial and quality performances of company-owned units are better than franchised units. However, the opposite is true when the particular characteristics of each unit are considered in account in the analysis.


Governance Structure Pure Strategy Satisfaction Rate Governance Mechanism Store Manager 
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We thank the reviewers for their helpful comments. Usual caveats apply.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Didier Chabaud
  • Arnaud Lavit d’ Hautefort
  • Stéphane Saussier
    • 1
  1. 1.IAE de ParisParisFrance

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