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Delegation and Autonomy in Franchising

  • Begoña López-Fernández
  • Susana López-Bayón
Chapter
Part of the Contributions to Management Science book series (MANAGEMENT SC.)

Abstract

This article provides evidence on the determinants of delegation of decision rights in franchise relationships. We suggest that the franchisor chooses the level of delegation to leverage the intangible assets of the franchisees and the franchisor and, simultaneously, to preserve the value of the brand name. While the empirical literature on franchising has studied these effects separately, we consider them together in a model on decentralization. The results show that the franchisee’s autonomy varies negatively with the franchisor’s intangible assets and brand name and positively with the inter-firm trust and the franchisees’ intangible assets. Finally, autonomy also varies negatively with the specific investments of the franchisees.

Keywords

Intangible Asset Specific Investment Residual Income Relational Governance Knowledge Asset 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This research has received support from the MCYT, through grant SEJ2007–63706/ECON, and from the EU’s Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development through grant CIT3–513420.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Begoña López-Fernández
  • Susana López-Bayón
    • 1
  1. 1.Facultad de Economía y EmpresaUniversidad de OviedoOviedoSpain

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