Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising

Part of the Contributions to Management Science book series (MANAGEMENT SC.)


The aim of the study is to explain the determinants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by formulating and testing various propositions derived from transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and relational view of governance. The degree of contractual completeness depends on behavioural uncertainty (negatively), trust (positively), franchisees’ specific investments (negatively), environmental uncertainty (negatively), intangibility of system specific know-how (negatively) and contract design capabilities (positively). The hypotheses are tested with a data base consisting of 52 franchise systems in Austria. The empirical results support the hypotheses regarding behavioural uncertainty, trust and intangible system-specific know-how.


Agency Theory Environmental Uncertainty Relational View Specific Investment Network Partner 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Business StudiesUniversity of ViennaViennaAustria

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