The Decision to Patent with Horizontal Product Differentiation

  • Alexandra Zaby
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


In this chapter we introduce the patenting decision into an oligopolistic model of horizontally differentiated products. The analysis presented here in large parts follows Zaby (2009b).We assume that a drastic product innovation is released on a new market where rivals may enter with non-infringing products as long as patent protection is not perfect. Product characteristics are assumed to be continuously distributed on a circle of unit-circumference where a patent protects a given range on the circle from the entry of rival firms.


Critical Threshold Reservation Price Market Entry Social Welfare Function Patent Protection 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag HD 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche FakultätLehrstuhl für WirtschaftstheorieTübingenGermany

Personalised recommendations