Abstract
In the last chapter, we have considered the impact of financial reforms program and the channels through which such outcomes were transmitted. Particularly, we have assessed the performance of various indicators expected to capture improvements in efficiency, competitiveness and allocational enhancements following the adoption of liberalized financial policies in our sample countries. From these results and assessments based on almost all conventionally used aggregates, it is observable that there has been modest contribution of financial liberalization in terms of promoting economic growth in Kenya and Malawi. Importantly, in both these two countries the monopolistic structure of the commercial banking system has limited the depth and breadth of the financial services offered even under liberalized financial regime. This chapter considers this issue further. Firstly, it provides a simple model within the framework of imperfectly competitive banking industry and looks at the behaviour of the interest rate spread. The strategy is to analyse the level of spread together with the impact of an entry by a new firm. In doing so, the model solution is initially given for liberalized market system and then extended for the case of repressed financial environment. Applying the solutions from these exercises, adverse effect of higher fixed (overhead) costs in terms of serving as a barrier to entry of new established financial institutions is considered. Secondly, with this theoretical treatment the chapter also provides empirical evidence on the issue of high fixed costs which explain the lack of entry by effective competitors in these economies.
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Notes
- 1.
An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the PhD Conference in Economics and Business, held on 10–12 November 2004, in the Australian National University, Canberra. I have greatly benefited from comments by Professor Peter Dixon.
- 2.
- 3.
To confirm this, an indicative proof is given in Appendix A5.1 where we examine whether the specified loan equation satisfy the conditions for a market equilibrium.
- 4.
For convenience we use \({\bar{r}_L \ {\rm and} \ {\bar{r}} }\) interchangeably.
- 5.
This fact is further investigated in the next section while we have discussed some supporting anecdotal evidences in the previous chapter.
- 6.
Notice that each zone of high (H), medium (K) and low (L) \({\bar{r} }\) will have a fixed costs level corresponding to before and after the entry of new firms, marked 1 and 2 respectively, where the first is greater than the second.
- 7.
See Appendix A5.2 for the proof.
- 8.
In this combined version, we can show that maximal points of fixed cost curves under C and D are greater than the fixed cost lines specified under liberalization. See Appendix A5.3 for a formal proof.
- 9.
In the lower part of the figure, if the change in \({\mathop {{\bar r^c}}}\) was infinitesimal we would not have the gulf in between the two critical values as indicated. We can also show a small similar region on the top part.
- 10.
We could also depict a different case where we observe a new entry following liberalization. However the institution about the change in d remains the same.
- 11.
This may be because such institutions have a better technology, the required expertise and are able to get a better combination of physical and human capital.
- 12.
Relatively, as opposed to this well established foreign institutions are expected to bring in more human capital.
- 13.
Denizer (1997) has also observed similar behaviors by some new local bank entrants in the case of Turkey.
- 14.
See Banking Supervision Report, 2001.
- 15.
See, for example, articles ‘Taken for a ride by Central Bank’ in Daily Nation, January 28th, 2004 and ‘CBK liable to pay all Euro Bank depositors’ in Daily Nation, April 8th, 2003.
- 16.
Brock and Suarez (2000) observe that lack of orderly exit procedures have resulted in a poorly managed banking environment in Latin America.
- 17.
Holm (2000, pp. 288-04) provides a classical discussion of institutional transformation in Botswana.
- 18.
In comparison, many judgments in Malawi and Kenya have been criticized as being peculiar and contrary to all reasonable expectations. See “All-Bank probe into $398M Bank Debts” in the East African Standard, October 20th, 2003.
- 19.
Likewise, such ownership documents may also be issued on lands that are non-existent. See also the article “Banks are warned on fake title deeds” in East African Standard, February 26th, 2004.
- 20.
Surprisingly, Kenya's Attorney General branded the legal sector as a failure, ineffective in administering justice and worst of all corrupt. See “Wako criticizes legal sector” in Daily Nation, June 8th, 1999.
- 21.
Similarly for a glaring lack of professionalism in Malawi see “Malawian Court Defeats Justice” in Society News, Wednesday, September 18th, 2002.
- 22.
In addition to the corruption problem, these are other failures related to deficiencies in perfecting and registering securities/assets that can be used as collateral by bank borrowers.
- 23.
Denizer (1997) has provided detailed discussion on this point.
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Appendices
Appendix A 5.1: Deriving the Market Equilibrium Condition for Loan Equation
To define our market equilibrium level of loan in the region between A and B, let us consider \({\bar{r} }\) in the critical. Does \({L = \bar {L}- \beta \bar{r} }\) satisfy the condition for market equilibrium? For firm i:
What happens if Li increases by one unit?
Substituting L in this equation we get:
If this change has a non-increasing effect on the profit function then:
Without any difficulty and undertaking little manipulation we finally derive that:
Since this condition holds, this implies that as long as \({\bar{r} \le {r^*}}\) we will be operating on our loan curve while the condition for market equilibrium is satisfied.
What happens if Li decreases by one unit? This will imply that:
With little manipulation while further simplifying this equation and collecting terms we can derive:
Through reformulation and simplification we observe a familiar equation such that:
Again since this condition holds, this indicates that as long as \({\bar{r} }\) is equal to or greater than the critical level of interest rate, \({\mathop {{\bar{r}^c}}}\), we will be operating on the curve. Combined together, we observe that the profit function is non-increasing in both directions within the region of \({\mathop {{\bar{r}^c}} \le \bar{r} \le {r^*}}\), thus we will be moving along the \({L = \bar{L}- \beta \bar{r} }\) curve.
Appendix A 5. 2: Deriving the Fixed Cost Lines for Medium and Lower Regions at \({\mathop {{\bar r\,^c}}\ }\)
\({\mathop {{\bar r\,^c}}\ }\)",6,1?>In Figure 5.8, it is necessary to investigate whether \({{F^{M1}} {F^{L1}}}\) along the \({\mathop {{\bar{r}^c}}}\) line. With the help of equation (5.21) and equation (5.22) while substituting the value of \({\bar{r} }\) at the critical, we can derive that:
Simplifying equation (A2) while collecting terms, it can be expressed as:
With little manipulation and further substitution after collecting terms this equation is given as:
Having derived this, since the first term in both equations is similar to that of equation (A1) it is understandable that if, in the second term the equation (A3) is greater than 1, that will imply that \({{F^{M1}} {F^{L1}}}\). To investigate further whether this holds, let us propose that:
Rearranging the above equation we can calculate that:
Finally while taking the case of \({n = 2}\) for simplicity and convenience, we get:
This simplifies to:
Since we know that this is not true, it implies that the last term in equation (A3) is greater than unity, which again means that \({{F^{M1}} {F^{L1}}}\).
Appendix A 5. 3: Maximal Points for C and D Curves
To investigate whether the maximal points of curves C and D are greater or lesser than the specified fixed costs under liberalization (FH1 and FH2), let us take that:
For simplicity, equation (A7) can be re-written as:
where a, b and c represent the given terms with respect to \({\bar{r} }\) in the original equation. Deriving the first order condition, we will get:
Therefore, solving for \({\bar{r} }\) and substituting this value into equation (A7), we will have:
Taking n to represent two firms initially and with the help of equation (A10), we can simplify equation (A7) to be:
With little manipulation while collecting terms we derive:
When equation (A12) is greater than equation (A8), it implies that \({16\beta 12\beta }\) which actually holds. Thus the maximum point of curve C must be higher than F given under equation (A8).
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Ahmed, A.D., Islam, S.M.N. (2010). An Analysis of the Economic Outcome of Financial Liberalization. In: Financial Liberalization in Developing Countries. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2168-0_5
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