A Comparison of Wage Inequality in For-profit, Non-Profit and Local Government Organizations: Nursing Homes in the Midwestern US

  • Avner Ben-Ner
  • Ting Ren
  • Darla Flint Paulson
Part of the AIEL Series in Labour Economics book series (AIEL)


This essay is devoted to investigate ownership-related wage differentials, distinguishing between nonprofit, for-profit and local government organizations, within a sample of US nursing homes. It focuses on within-organization across-occupation wage dispersion. The results do not support widespread opinions about wage dispersion across the three ownership types. Neither the intrinsic motivation perspective’s prediction of less inequality among employees in nonprofit and government sectors, nor the agency theory prediction that higher level employees will use their influence to increase their own well-being without increasing the well-being of others, are supported.


Nursing Home Intrinsic Motivation Nonprofit Organization Agency Theory Nonprofit Sector 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



We acknowledge support from Aspen Institute Grant NSRF 2005-1, “A Comparative Study of Organizational Structure, Behavior and Performance in For-Profit Firms, Government Organizations, and Nonprofit Organizations”.


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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Avner Ben-Ner
    • 1
  • Ting Ren
    • 1
  • Darla Flint Paulson
    • 1
  1. 1.Carlson School of ManagementUniversity of MinnesotaMinneapolisUSA

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