The Anticompetitive Effects of the Antitrust Policy

  • David Bartolini
  • Alberto Zazzaro
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


Few scholars have seriously considered the possibility that the very existence of an antitrust law might make markets less competitive. In this chapter, we provide a selective review of this thought-provoking literature. The focus of our analysis is on contributions within the limits of the neo-classical theory of firms and markets, pointing out that antitrust legislation can hinder price/output competition. Following this literature, the introduction of antitrust penalties or leniency programmes can have the perverse effect of stabilizing cartels and increasing their size, as these policies may raise the costs of deviating and/or renegotiating a collusive agreement.


Nash Equilibrium Coalition Structure Grand Coalition Antitrust Authority Antitrust Policy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



We would like to thank participants of the conference “The Economics of Imperfect Markets,” held in Rome (May 2008), for useful comments on an earlier draft of this work. Usual disclaimer applies.


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Copyright information

© Springer Physica-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Università Politecnica delle MarcheAnconaItaly
  2. 2.Osservatorio per le Politiche Economiche Regionali (OPERA)AnconaItaly
  3. 3.Università Politecnica delle MarcheAnconaItaly
  4. 4.Money and Finance Research Group (MoFiR) and CFEPSRAnconaItaly

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