Countervailing Buyer Power and Mobile Termination
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)
Different countries have different practices with regard to charging for calls to mobile.
KeywordsEuropean Union Market Power Mobile Network Regulatory Intervention Retail Prex
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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